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引用本文:徐舒浩:内在陈述的表达主义构造成立吗?——哈特后设法理论立场之诠释,载《交大法学》2022年第6期,第58~76页。
Xu Shuhao, Is There Any Reason to Support Expressivist Reshape of Internal Statement?—An Interpretation of Hart's Metalegal Theory, (6) SJTU LAW REVIEW 58-76 (2022).
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内在陈述的表达主义构造成立吗?——哈特后设法理论立场之诠释
徐舒浩1
中国人民大学法学院
摘要:
表达主义旨在从哲学自然主义框架内部,以一种区别于自然主义还原论的方式解释规范性概念的含义。通过对内在陈述的纯粹表达主义构造,法律实证主义可以容纳理论分歧或者实质法律争议,证明内在陈述与言说者的动机必然关联,并且支持一种承认规则的弱存在性主张。但是,由于无法处理嵌入难题以及解释内在—外在陈述分歧,内在陈述的纯粹表达主义重构面临危机。作为替代方案,混合表达主义认为内在陈述同时拥有属性指派和态度表达两个部分。然而,混合表达主义并不能承诺在每一类规范性语句中,对应描述性述谓的态度都能够被合理构想,因此依然没有摆脱嵌入难题。更妥当的策略或许是接受一种准表达主义,它承认规范性语句是对意动心灵状态或者态度的表达,但态度部分既不会进入表达之内容的语义之中,也不与规范性判断的描述性部分必然关联,而是以一种语用蕴含的方式传递评价性信息,由此,准表达主义同时回应了嵌入难题与分歧难题。
关键词:  表达主义 内在陈述 理论分歧 嵌入难题
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Is There Any Reason to Support Expressivist Reshape of Internal Statement?—An Interpretation of Hart's Metalegal Theory
Xu Shuhao
Abstract:
Expressivists aim at giving an account of normative concepts in the way that is distinct from analytical naturalism while remaining in the framework of philosophical naturalism. A pure expressivist's interpretation of an internal statement for legal positivism can be in favor of explaining the theoretical disagreement or genuine legal dispute, justifying a necessary connection between internal statement and speakers' motivation, and supporting a weak assertion of the rule of recognition. The pure expressivism, however, is at risk for it lacks approaches to solve the embedding problem and accounts for internal-external statements disagreement. Alternatively, hybrid expressivists state that an internal statement has properties-ascribing as well as desire-like attitude expressing aspects. Unfortunately, hybrid expressivism could not commit that in every kind of normative statement, the desire-like attitudes can have a special kind of stability, so it fails to solve the embedding problem. A more persuasive strategy might be quasi-expressivism, which accepts that normative discourse normally expresses a desire-like attitude or conative state of mind, but this part of communication never enters into the meaning of the normative sentences, and only has a contingent connection with the descriptive aspect of normative judgment, instead, it delivers evaluative information through pragmatic implication. Thus, quasi-expressivism solves the embedding problem and disagreement problem simultaneously. Keywords
Key words:  Expressivism, Internal Statement, Theoretical Disagreement, Embedding Problem
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