| 摘要: |
| 普通法立宪主义的兴起旨在回应议会主权所面临的现实挑战，打破越权无效原则的争论僵局，重新定位议会主权与法治原则的关系。一方面承继了柯克、戴雪的传统普通法理论，另一方面又发展了德沃金、富勒的自由主义理论资源，普通法立宪主义旨在重构法院的宪法角色的正当性，将法院塑造为共同体道德论辩的平台。其理论诉求遭到来自司法、历史和本质三方面的质疑，后来的理论修正也并不成功。以当代英国的宪制图景为比照，普通法立宪主义虽然弥补了法律实证立场的不足，但偏离了司法决定情境化的法律实践，也打破了不成文宪法内含的权力平衡。作为一种规范性的理论，普通法立宪主义的解释与建构虽有不足，却是阐释英国宪法多元面向的勇敢尝试。 |
| 关键词: 普通法立宪主义 议会主权 法治 普通法 |
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| 基金项目:2019年国家社会科学基金重大研究专项“以法规备案审查制度彰显社会主义核心价值观研究”（项目编号： 19VHJ015） |
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| On the Contribution and Deficiency of Common Law Constitutionalism |
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Xiong Linman
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| Abstract: |
| The rise of common law constitutionalism aims to respond to the real challenges faced by parliamentary sovereignty， to break the impasse in the debate over the principle of ultra vires， and to reorient the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the principle of the rule of law． Inheriting the traditional common law theory of Coke and Dicey on the one hand， and developing the liberalism theory of Dworkin and Fuller on the other， common law constitutionalism seeks to reconstruct the legitimacy of the courts constitutional role and shape the court as a platform for communal moral discourse． Its theoretical claims were challenged from three perspectives： judicial， historical and essential， and subsequent theoretical revisions were unsuccessful． Compared with the constitutional picture of contemporary Britain， common law constitutionalism， while compensating for the shortcomings of legal positivism， deviates from the contextualized legal practice of judicial decisions and disrupts the balance of power embedded in Britains unwritten constitution． As a normative theory， the interpretation and construction of common law constitutionalism， while inadequate， is a courageous attempt to explain the pluralistic orientation of the English Constitution． |
| Key words: Common Law Constitutionalism, Parliamentary Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Common Law |
