| 摘要: |
| 意图主义和新文本主义之间的论争贯穿了美国法律解释理论发展的始终。20世纪90年代之前，意图主义是占主导地位的法律解释方法，体现了一种阶层式的分权观。伴随着法律现实主义、公共选择理论和形式化分权观带来的学术批判，新文本主义解释方法逐渐兴起。在90年代，双方对谢弗伦二阶审查法进行了符合自身理论需求的解读，并以此为载体展开新一轮论争。对这场论争需要加以反思。当一种法律解释方法不将正当性诉诸自身的实效，而是某种民主分权原则时，就会走向一种基础主义的版本，走进自身所批判的理论困境。应当破除对基础主义的迷信，从法官解释制定法的制度条件、经验工具和解释后果等因素重新审视作为方法的解释理论所内含的实践理性，从而沟通法律解释的理论与实践。 |
| 关键词: 法律解释 意图主义 新文本主义 谢弗伦二阶审查法 去基础主义 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目: |
|
| Research on the Methods of Statutory Interpretation in U.S. — Centered on the Debate between the Intentionalism and the New Textualism |
|
Ao Haijing
|
|
|
| Abstract: |
| The debate between intentionalism and new textualism has run through the development of American statutory interpretation theory. Before the 1990s， intentionalism was the dominant method of interpretation of statutes， embodying a hierarchical doctrine of separation of powers. With the academic criticism brought about by legal realism， public choice theory and the formalistic doctrine of separation of powers， new textualism has gradually emerged. In the 1990s， both sides interpreted Chevron two step doctrine according to their respective theoretical needs， and used them as the carriers to launch a new round of debate. This debate should be reflected deeply. If the legitimacy of any legal interpretation method has not depended on its own effectiveness， but on some democratic principle of separation of powers， it would inevitably toward a version of foundationalism and fall into the theoretical dilemma that it has criticized. The superstition of foundationalism should be broken， and the practical rationality contained in the interpretation theory as a method should be re examined from the judges's interpretation of the institutional conditions， empirical tools and interpretation consequences of the statute， so as to communicate the theory and the practice of legal interpretation. |
| Key words: Statutory Interpretation, Intentionalism, New Textualism, Chevron Two Step Doctrine, De Foundationalism |
