| 摘要: |
| 经营者集中强制申报通过对交易的事前审查来减少对竞争的损害。与此同时，事前强制审查也会带来申报门槛设定、行政、调查、交易时滞等方面的成本，因而有必要对比制度运行的收益与代价，进而考虑制度变革的可能方式。中国对于经营者集中案件在禁止、救济上的比例偏低，加上威慑效果严重不足，导致强制事前审查的收益有限；而在案件调查、交易时滞、申报等方面的成本显著。相比之下，自愿申报审查以及转变为事后审查虽然在阻止限制竞争的集中交易上的收益较少，但可以节省大量成本。对制度运行收益与成本的总体分析，可以作为经营者集中审查制度未来变革的选项。 |
| 关键词: 反垄断法 经营者集中 强制申报 自愿申报 成本与收益 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目:国家社会科学基金年度项目“中国反垄断法的移植与本土化研究”（项目编号：18BFX150） |
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| Effects and Reform of the Compulsory Notification Mechanism under Merger Control in China |
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Li Jian
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| Abstract: |
| The compulsory notifications of mergers transactions under the framework of antitrust law aim to remedy anti competitive harm by ex ante process. Such a mechanism brings prominent costs in addition to the benefits. It is thus necessary to evaluate both the costs and benefits to implement such a mechanism to see if there is an efficient alternative. The enforcement of Chinas merger control demonstrated insufficient benefits due to the low proportion of blocked and conditional approved cases and unsatisfactory deterrence effects. In the meanwhile， the costs to implement the compulsory mechanism in China is substantially larger， including high investigation costs， high opportunity costs associated with suspended merger transactions， and high notification costs. In comparison， the voluntary notification mechanism， though superficially producing less benefits in preventing anti competitive mergers， can significantly save implementation costs. Given the limited administrative budget and the active ex post antitrust enforcement currently ongoing in China， the voluntary mechanism is advisable to be the most feasible option for the future reform. |
| Key words: Merger Control, Compulsory Notification, Voluntary Notification, Costs and Benefit |
