| 摘要: |
| 推定转售价格维持（RPM）竞争损害的一项重要理论支撑是，RPM导致涨价。论者得出这一结论时使用了多种价格基准。以完全竞争价格为基准，实质是要求生产商以边际成本定价。以个别经销商收取的实际市场价格为基准，实质是禁止生产商维护正当利益。以假如不实施RPM原本会出现的价格为基准，不具有任何意义，因为此种涨价是RPM的本质所在和必然结果。以有效竞争状态下的价格为基准，要求在计算垄断涨价的过程中排除其他因素的影响，不具有可操作性。由于福利要素具有多样性，涨价本身并不能证明福利损害；由于涨价既不是竞争损害的必要条件也非充分条件，涨价也不能证明竞争损害。在美国公平贸易法实践提供的自然实验中，虽然观察到RPM导致涨价的表象，实质却是碎片化的实施体制导致的扭曲效应。论者论证RPM涨价时使用的相关数量或者使用数据的方式经常具有误导性。因此，RPM导致涨价不足以支持RPM推定损害竞争。同样，直接以价格效应证明其他竞争损害的做法也值得怀疑。 |
| 关键词: 反垄断法 转售价格维持 竞争损害 涨价 |
| DOI： |
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| Myths about Price Increase as a Competitive Harm and their Debunking：From the Perspective of RPM |
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Lan Lei
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| Abstract: |
| One important theoretical underpinning of the presumption of competitive harm by RPM is the opinion that RPM increases price. Holders of this opinion use quite a few benchmarks in drawing this conclusion. Taking complete competitive price as benchmark effectively demands manufacturers to price at their marginal costs. Taking the market price actually charged by a specific dealer effectively prohibits manufacturers from protecting their legitimate interests. Taking the price that would have existed without RPM as benchmark is meaningless， because this kind of price increase is the essence and necessary result of RPM. Taking price under workable competition as benchmark demands exclusion of other factors in calculating monopoly overcharge， being not administrative. Due to the multiplicity of elements of welfare， price increase by itself cannot prove injury to welfare； and price increase is neither necessary condition nor sufficient condition of competitive injury， therefore， price increase cannot prove competitive injury， either. In the natural experiments provided by the U.S. fair trade law practices， although RPM induced price increases are observed， their essence is distortion caused by the fractured nature of RPM implementation in U.S. Data and methods of presenting data used to support the proposition of RPM increasing prices often are misleading. Therefore， that RPM increases price does not suffice to support the presumption of competitive harm by RPM. In the same token， the practice of using price effects as direct evidence of other competitive harm is also doubtful. |
| Key words: Antitrust, Resale Price Maintenance, Competitive Injury, Price Increase |
