| 摘要: |
| 我国经营者集中“控制”概念在立法上的模糊界定导致执法机构具有极大的自由裁量权，执法机构对控制的扩张性解释造成制度的不稳定以及经营者较高的合规成本。控制应被界定为直接或者间接、单独或者共同对其他经营者施加决定性影响或重大影响的现实可能性。理论上，对于股权收购引发的控制认定问题，应在公司治理的具体模式下，构建以表决权为核心的形式标准和以权力来源为划分的实质标准。具体而言，应反思欧盟模式的弊端，在英国等混合模式的基础上，通过“形式标准+实质标准+例外排除”的规定方式，构建“决定性影响—重大影响”双层控制体系，并将董事会一票否决权、表决权转让协议、公司公章等我国公司治理的特殊实践纳入分析框架；对于被动财务投资和发生在金融机构中的暂时性控制交易，应当构建控制的例外排除规则。 |
| 关键词: 经营者集中 控制 决定性影响 重大影响 公司治理 |
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| The Standard of “Control” of the Undertaking Concentration — Analysis based on the Corporate Governance Model |
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Wang Huiqun
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| Abstract: |
| The ambiguous legislative definition of the “control” concept in undertaking concentration in China grants enforcement agencies significant discretionary power. The expansive interpretations of control by enforcement agencies have led to institutional instability and imposed exceptionally high compliance costs on undertakings. Control shall be defined as the realistic possibility of exercising decisive or significant influence on other undertakings directly or indirectly, individually or jointly. Theoretically, regarding the determination of control arising from equity acquisitions, a formal standard centered on voting rights and a substantive standard based on the source of power should be established within the specific model of corporate governance. Specifically, the study calls for a reflection on the drawbacks of the EU model and proposes a control standard based on the UK's mixed model, incorporating “formal standards + substantive standards + exceptional exclusions”. The analysis framework includes China's unique corporate governance practices such as the board's veto power, voting right transfer agreements, corporate seals, and actual control of licenses. For passive financial investment and temporary control transactions occurring in financial institutions, exception exclusion rules for control should be established. |
| Key words: Undertaking Concentration, Control, Decisive Influence, Significant Influence, Corporate Governance |
