| 摘要: |
| 损害引发法律强制，特别是刑法的回应。社会变迁和科技发展产生了新的损害形态，但损害的概念内涵难以确定，导致损害的犯罪化边界难以划定。传统刑法哲学通过证成损害原则来理解损害，以范伯格为代表的刑法哲学家以损害为依据为刑法强制划定界限。但这种理论路径面临两难困境： 既无法借助损害的概念来为损害原则的正当性辩护，也未能充分展示损害的概念结构。其他理论家通过比较意义上的损害观、反事实的损害观和道德意义上的损害观揭示损害的概念，为损害原则的辩护寻找新的出路。从对这些立场的批评和辩护可以看出，损害与法律家长主义和法律道德主义也可以兼容。损害的概念内涵虽然充满分歧，但有助于更好地回应实践中的疑难情形，为理解刑法中的法益和智能时代的数字损害提供了支持。 |
| 关键词: 损害 损害原则 范伯格 刑法哲学 数字损害 |
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| 基金项目:北京市社会科学基金一般项目“数字人权的法理证成和法律保障研究”（项目编号： 22FXB009） |
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| What is Harm? An Analysis from Criminal Law Philosophy Perspective |
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Zheng Yushuang
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| Abstract: |
| Harm triggers legal enforcement, especially criminal law responses. Social change and technological development have produced new forms of harm, but the conceptual implication of harm is difficult to determine, which makes it difficult to delineate the boundaries of the criminalization of harm. Traditional criminal law philosophy understands harm through the justification of the harm principle, and criminal law philosophers represented by Feinberg use harm as a basis to delineate the mandatory boundaries for criminal law. However, this theoretical approach faces a dilemma: it cannot rely on the concept of harm to defend the legitimacy of the harm principle, nor can it fully demonstrate the conceptual structure of harm. Other theorists reveal the concept of harm through the comparative view of harm, the counterfactual view of harm and the moral sense of harm, in order to construct new ways to defend the principle of harm. It follows from criticisms and defenses of these positions that harm is also compatible with legal paternalism and legal moralism. Although the conceptual implication of harm is fully divergent, it helps to better respond to difficult situations in practice and provides support for understanding legal interests of digital harm in the AI era. |
| Key words: Harm, Harm Principle, Feinberg, Criminal Law Philosophy, Digital Harm |
