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引用本文:高圣惕、赵思涵:科技运用活动与岛礁法律地位的认定: 南海仲裁裁决对《公约》第 121(3)条解释及适用的错误,载《交大法学》2023年第1期,第59~78页。
Gao Shengti & Zhao Sihan, Application of Technology and Decision of Legal Status of “Rocks”— Mistakes of the Interpretation and Application of UNCLOS Article 121(3) by the Tribunal for the South China Sea Arbitration, (1) SJTU LAW REVIEW 59-78 (2023).
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科技运用活动与岛礁法律地位的认定: 南海仲裁裁决对《公约》第 121(3)条解释及适用的错误
高圣惕、赵思涵1
武汉大学国际法所
摘要:
《联合国海洋法公约》第121(3)条对岩礁“不能维持人类居住或其本身经济生活”之规定,语意模糊。南海仲裁裁决对此条款的解释及适用更是极具争议。本文依据条约解释规则,从科技运用活动影响岛礁法律地位的视角来发现裁决的问题。裁决并未使用“动态解释法”来解释“不能”的含义,遂忽视了科技进步对岛礁客观能力的积极影响。裁决错误解读“自然形成”的通常意义及上下文,将“自然”条件延伸适用于岛礁的“维持”阶段,排除了外来技术作为“维持”的方法。裁决用《公约》文本找不到的材料推导出条约之目的,忽略“奖励”沿海国以科技发展实现对岛礁的最大化开发也是目的之一。裁决中“接近人类居住能力的界限”不采用人类最低居住标准,无视欠发达国家人民的居住状况,所谓“大规模人为改变”的条件也无法普遍适用。裁决无视任何具有岛屿的国家竭尽所能地运用科技改善岛屿居住条件、维护环境、防止侵蚀和淹没的事实。如此违反条约解释原则、背离现实及国家实践的裁决解释与适用,不具有良好的事实及法律根据。
关键词:  南海仲裁裁决 《联合国海洋法公约》第121(3)条 科技运用 岛屿及岩礁 条约解释
DOI:
分类号:
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重点项目“南海仲裁案后的南海法律问题研究”(项目编号: 18AFX026)和重大项目“基于中国立场的海洋争端解决机制实证研究”(项目编号: 19VHQ008)
Application of Technology and Decision of Legal Status of “Rocks”— Mistakes of the Interpretation and Application of UNCLOS Article 121(3) by the Tribunal for the South China Sea Arbitration
Gao Shengti & Zhao Sihan
Abstract:
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS is ambiguous in the condition of “rocks”, that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own”. The award of the South China Sea Arbitration is highly controversial. Using the rules of treaty interpretation, this research focuses on how the application of technology affects the legal status of islands and rocks so as to identify certain problems of the award. The award does not adopt an evolutionary interpretation of “cannot” and thus ignores the positive impact of technological progress upon the development of the objective capacity of islands. The award misunderstands the ordinary meaning and context of “naturally formed”, and extends the restriction of “naturally” to the stage of maintenance so as to exclude the use of external technology. Further, the award uses the materials missing in the UNCLOS text to deduce the object and purpose, and ignores one of the purposes of UNCLOS is to “reward” coastal states for maximizing the development of marine features through technological development. The test of “fall close to the line in terms of their capacity to sustain human habitation” in the award neither considers the minimum standard of human habitation nor the living conditions of people from the underdeveloped states. The test of “significant human modification” cannot be universally applied, either. The interpretation made by the award overlooks the fact that no country with islands will abandon technology for improving living conditions, protecting the environment, and preventing erosion and inundation. Such an interpretation that deviates from treaty interpretation principles, international reality and state practice cannot be considered as being well founded in fact and law.
Key words:  The South China Sea Arbitration Award, Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, Application of Technology, Islands and Rocks, Treaty Interpretation
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