摘要: |
相较行政权对金融市场的监管,司法权在金融规制中的作用未受到足够关注。中国借款利率长期以来受到中国人民银行和最高人民法院的"双轨"规制,在规则层面形成冲突。实证考察发现,规则冲突引发了最高人民法院和各地人民法院司法裁判的多种指向与不协调。对于这种规制冲突,可以从法律技术、规制架构和规制理念三方面进行解释,具体包括各级各地法院法律技术的不统一、中央层面司法权与行政权在金融规制上的边界模糊和司法部门与行政部门对金融规制的理念差异。未来应当更加尊重商事交易意思自治的规制理念,巩固中国人民银行主管金融借款利率的规制架构,并确立优先调整利息构成而非总量的法律技术。 |
关键词: 金融规制、司法权、金融借款合同纠纷、利率上限、实证研究 |
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Conflicts of Administrative and Judicial Powers in Chinese Financial Regulatory Regime: An Empirical Study on the Interest Rate Ceiling of Financial Borrowings |
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Abstract: |
Compared with the financial regulation by administrative powers, the role of judicial powers in Chinese financial regulatory regime has not received enough attention. Interest rate ceiling rules on financial borrowing have long been subject to “dual-track” regulations by both the People’s Bank of China and the Supreme People’s Court, which has created conflicts at the rule level. The empirical study finds that the conflicts have further triggered inconsistencies in judicial decisions among the Supreme People’s Court and local people’s courts. Such regulatory conflicts can be explained from three aspects: legal technology, regulatory framework, and regulatory philosophy, specifically including the inconsistency of legal technology among courts from all levels and localities, the overstep of judicial power over administrative power at the central level, and the difference of financial regulatory philosophies between judicial and administrative powers. Future institutional designs should strengthen the regulatory philosophy of respecting the autonomy of commercial transactions, strengthen the supervision structure of the People’s Bank of China in charge of financial borrowing interest rates, and establish the legal technology that prioritizes the adjustment of interest composition rather than the total amount, thereby promoting the scientific division of financial supervision, the credibility of financial judicial justice, and the health development of Chinese financial market. |
Key words: Financial Regulation, Judicial Power, Disputes over Financial Borrowing Contracts, Interest Rate Ceiling, Empirical Study |